Coach watch: Pep Guardiola

Profile
Manchester City were widely considered to have recruited the most sought-after manager in the world when they persuaded Pep Guardiola to leave Bayern Munich for the Premier League in 2016. An admirer of, among others, Marcelo Bielsa, and a disciple of the late, great, Johan Cruyff, Guardiola is credited with, at Barcelona from 2008 to 2012, developing perhaps the finest club team of all time.

During his time at City he has overseen not only two Premier League titles, one FA Cup and three League Cups, but also a new Premier League points record, and records for the most goals scored and the most league wins during the course of a season. If suggestions that City’s 2017/18 title winners represented the best team in Premier League history continue to divide observers, there will be none who disagree that his teams play only the most stylish and attacking brands of football.

Playing style
While he is a manager who regularly changes his team’s structure, Guardiola remains fiercely committed to several core principles. His teams consistently play short from their goalkeeper – from both goal kicks and open play – and largely because of his desire to create a numerical overload by having one more passing option than the total number of players applying the opposing team’s press.

By creating an overload in the first line of an attempted build-up, a team should be capable of overcoming most pressing strategies; Guardiola buys goalkeepers capable of hitting long, accurate passes because of the options such a player gives his teams. Through posing a threat in behind they can threaten with the double jeopardy rule – opponents either apply an advanced press and risk leaving spaces behind them, or sit off, and invite City to build short.

If opponents apply an advanced press with two forwards, Guardiola’s team rearrange to adopt a back three – one most commonly built on two central defenders and a midfielder dropping in alongside them, or via one full-back advancing and the other adopting a more central position. If opponents press with a front three, a back four is preserved and an advanced midfielder or inside-moving wide midfielder withdraws to a position alongside the deepest-lying midfielder to target the spaces between that front three. Like building from their goalkeeper, these ongoing attempts to create a free player in the first phase of possession are also central to Guardiola’s desired positional play.

It is their attempts to make penetrative passes towards forward-facing players that lead to their use of a third individual; opponents adopting reserved defensive blocks make it difficult to receive the ball while facing forwards. Progressing possession via a third player (below) is a suitable alternative when the direct route between two players is blocked. One regular pattern involves a defender playing to a wide forward or central attacker who has withdrawn into midfield and that third player, in turn, sending possession on to a further midfielder. The determination to dominate those central areas of the pitch contributes to that; numerous high-quality players in that territory increases their grasp of possession there, and encourages their most effective players to remain in the areas of the pitch they most relish.

It is his vision, and his ability to design particularly complex strategies built on his players’ qualities, that is perhaps Guardiola’s greatest strength. His approach at Barca used the passing ability of Xavi Hernández, Andrés Iniesta and Sergio Busquets, and the movement and positioning of Lionel Messi. At Bayern he introduced the false full-back to encourage overloads in central positions, and a system that led to wide forwards Franck Ribéry and Arjen Robben attacking defenders one-on-one, Philip Lahm contributing to their dominance of possession in central midfield, and Robert Lewandowski both offering a focal point and leading their counter-press.

The use of false full-backs has continued at City. Fabian Delph and later Oleksandr Zinchenko have proved capable of drifting from left-back to create a double pivot in front of the three-man defence they had left. What often becomes a 3-2-2-3, or W-M, formation involves their four-strong central midfield box outnumbering the midfield threes they most regularly encounter. When he has opted against using a 4-3-3, an alternative back three has been favoured in which Kyle Walker has featured (below, when an overload has been created towards the left), Rodri has operated as the sole defensive midfielder, and lone striker Sergio Agüero or Gabriel Jesus move towards the left to target Kevin De Bruyne’s crosses and also to create space on the right.

Defending and pressing
Another consistent feature of Guardiola’s teams has been the immediate, aggressive counter-press they apply when possession is lost. Given he demands his team build possession close together and in numbers, any opponent winning the ball will quickly be surrounded.

His team at Barca counter-pressed with the intention of intercepting passes, because so many of his players were so strong at reacting to those passes and cutting them out; at Bayern, a more assertive counter-press encouraged those stronger at duelling for possession via direct challenges. City essentially offer a blend of the two, owing to the regularity of second balls in the energetic, combative Premier League that demands they have strong individuals, and the intensity to press and intercept.

Guardiola prefers his team to defend with a 4-1-4-1 defensive block that becomes a 4-4-2 when they are defending for long periods, via De Bruyne advancing to play alongside Agüero or Jesus up front. That 4-4-2 can evolve into a 4-2-4 when Raheem Sterling and Riyad Mahrez or Bernardo Silva break forwards. The more recent use of Fernandinho as a central defender, and his willingness to move forward and intercept passes (above), has become crucial to those shapes following their midfield five becoming a four; it is when the Brazilian doesn’t succeed against his direct opponent that they can appear more vulnerable.

For all of their increased numbers in the final third, City have risked becoming easier to score against because, in the absence of the double pivot created by a false full-back, they have conceded higher-quality goalscoring chances. Where there previously existed two players protecting the three remaining in defence, there is now more often just one.