Tottenham Hotspur adopted a Latin motto when they were founded in the 19th century: Audere est Facere. These days, the club use the English translation: To Dare Is To Do. Either way, it is Greek-born Australian Ange Postecoglou’s tactics that have helped them rediscover its meaning in the 21st century.
With 26 points from his first 10 league games in charge, Postecoglou led Tottenham to their best start in the Premier League era. It was also the most points achieved by any manager in their first 10 Premier League fixtures. And all of it was done by playing Postecoglou’s daring brand of football.
Notably, this rip-roaring start was achieved despite the pre-season sale of their record goalscorer, Harry Kane. But then Postecoglou has made a career out of proving doubters wrong, restoring the fortunes of the teams he has taken over.
In more than a quarter of a century of football management – previously in Australia, Japan and Scotland – he has left his mark and claimed trophies along the way. That experience has shaped clear principles that he wasted no time in implementing in north London.
If the early results were impressive, perhaps as important to Spurs supporters has been the style of football the Australian has brought with him. Here, our UEFA-licensed coaches have analysed some key aspects of Postecoglou’s Tottenham tactics…
Full-backs inside
After 12 games of the 2023/24 Premier League season, Tottenham were one of five sides to average at least 60 per cent possession. This stood in contrast with the four seasons prior to Postecoglou’s arrival.
Under their three previous managers – Antonio Conte, Nuno Espírito Santo and José Mourinho – Tottenham averaged 51 per cent possession. That in itself was a departure from the style during Mauricio Pochettino’s time in charge. In the Argentine’s last full campaign at the helm, in 2018/19, Spurs averaged 58 per cent possession – much more similar to Postecoglou’s style.
The shift back to having more possession inevitably means that Tottenham make more passes per 90 minutes. Compared with the four seasons prior to Postecoglou, they are also dribbling much more. Their average of 28.24 dribbles per 90 minutes was the most in the league after 12 games – and almost identical to the numbers in Pochettino’s final season.
One key aspect of Postecoglou’s style at Spurs has been a deeper build-up from the back. A diamond shape, made up of the goalkeeper at the base, the centre-backs and then the deepest pivot supporting, has helped to break the first line. Although the full-backs offer support for passes around, they also move inside. This has been a key feature of Postecoglou’s previous teams.
The full-backs moving inside works to create overloads in the central spaces. This facilitates a possession-based style via additional passing options in the middle of the pitch. One full-back moves inside to form a double pivot, often behind an opposing front line of three. There, they can offer to receive in the gaps between this opposing front line.
Both full-backs have also moved inside on occasion, to try to narrow the opposing wingers. When they were followed, larger spaces have been created in wide areas for Tottenham’s wingers to attack 1v1. When right-back Pedro Porro has narrowed, Dejan Kulusevski has particularly benefited from space to receive and drive at his opponent, with Pape Matar Sarr supporting underneath. After 12 games, Kulusevski had the third most dribbles in the Premier League.
On the left, Son Heung-min and Brennan Johnson have been used as wingers, and have found similar spaces to Kulusevski. James Maddison widening as the number 10 in a 4-2-3-1 shape has also found joy, when left-back Destiny Udogie has inverted into central midfield (below).
James Maddison
Prior to his November injury, Maddison as the initial number 10 in the 4-2-3-1 formation was a key attacking outlet for Spurs. He also contributed significantly to the deeper build-up.
The England international is comfortable dropping towards his own goal, especially if one or both of Spurs’ full-backs have progressed forward. There, he has become a second pivot player, helping build through the centre. He helps narrow an opposing press, before bouncing the ball into wide areas. The pairing of full-back and winger can then progress the ball forward.
Maddison has also showcased his line-breaking passing into advanced teammates. This has typically been those filling the number 10 spaces between the lines, as full-backs or wingers move inside (below). Maddison has then rejoined the move as a 10, supporting from his usual position.
As a high and central number 10 between the lines, he has developed an important relationship with Son. Since Kane’s departure, the Korean has become Spurs’ main central-forward threat. Maddison, who joined Tottenham in the summer of 2023, has provided deft balls in behind for Son’s penetrative runs.
Maddison has supplied others in Tottenham’s front line, such as Richarlison. This has especially been the case when the wingers stay wide as long as possible, stretching the opposing back line. From a slightly withdrawn 10 position, Maddison has also played through balls for wide forwards to cross or cut back.
When moving wide to the left, with left-back Udogie moving into central midfield, Maddison has tended to come back inside on to his stronger right foot. From there, he has been able to make incisive passes. Maddison ranked joint-fourth for the most through balls in the Premier League after 12 rounds of fixtures.
Son as the nine
In the first three league games of the season, Son started as a left-winger, without managing to score himself. He then moved central as the lone striker, scoring a hat-trick at Burnley (below) in his first start as a number nine under Postecoglou.
Although Son has played in a central-forward role for Spurs in the past, the start of the 2023/24 season was the longest he’d been used as the central attacking focal point. His biggest strength in the role is the timing and purpose of his movements. He has operated extremely well on the last shoulder of the deepest defender, displaying movements in behind that recall the likes of Jamie Vardy or Michael Owen.
Son’s calmness in front of goal has stemmed from these well-timed central runs. He allows himself extra time and touches, when needed, to finish. That he has been able to do so is because he has worked in behind efficiently, without being caught offside.
Like Maddison, Son has benefited from the width and movements of the wingers. They have often occupied full-backs and disrupted back lines with their own movements. Son has gleefully taken advantage of this disruption, latching on to through balls from central midfield. Maddison has typically been the supplier, but on occasion an inverted full-back has supplied the key pass.
Son has also shown his predatory instincts and goalscoring abilities when facing a deeper back line – especially in the area just beyond the penalty spot. He has intelligently positioned himself between central defenders, as Tottenham built around an opposing back line. Instead of letting the ball come to him, Son has shown well-timed, explosive movements to get across his man, enabling first-time finishes (below).
His fast but late individual movements have given Tottenham a goalscoring number nine who can exploit the space and finish from wide deliveries. Following Kane’s departure, this has proven ideal in replacing his goal threat in this area.
Defensive strategy shift
As Postecoglou wants to dominate possession, pressing high up the pitch has been the predominant defensive strategy. Counter-pressing has also helped restore territory, momentum and control in games.
This has been another significant shift compared to previous managerial approaches at the club. After 12 games, Postecoglou’s side led the way in the Premier League for duels, tackles and interceptions per minute of opposition possession. This highlights their aggression in hunting for the ball at every opportunity.
Postecoglou’s side also had the lowest passes per defensive action (PPDA) in the entire division – another indication of their pressing intensity. In the previous four seasons, Tottenham were on average 11th in the league for this metric.
Conte, Nuno and Mourinho were content for their teams to sit in mid or low blocks, often in a back-five formation. On some occasions, Mourinho even deployed a back six. By contrast, in Pochettino’s final season with Spurs, they were second lowest for PPDA. Postecoglou’s side has been matching many of the defensive outputs of the Pochettino era.
One particular high-pressing strategy from Postecoglou has seen Son jump on to the centre-backs. There, he aims to force the ball in a specific direction. This tactic has seen the closest winger narrow as they join the press, often stopping passes into the inside channel. Any subsequent passes around have involved the winger pressing outwards, locking the ball along the touchline.
If Son has been unable to lock play one way, either Maddison as the 10, or the furthest winger, has joined him. If Maddison jumps, both wingers narrow. Spurs then press in a 4-4-1-1, similar to how Manchester City move into their defensive shape. Alternatively, as the winger jumps, Maddison has joined the central-midfield unit in a player-oriented approach. The full-back, or on occasion a number eight, has also engaged to help press the ball out wide.
The back line’s height has allowed Postecoglou’s side to press high and counter-press aggressively. This was best demonstrated when they received two red cards at home to Chelsea (below).
Despite the numerical disadvantage, Postecoglou instructed his team to hold an incredibly high back line (above). The line ahead dropped back in a very compact, but still high, defensive shape.
Squeezing the pitch like this with 11 players has minimised the space teams have to build. Crucially, it has reduced the distances for the midfield three to cover when competing for regains, loose balls and second contacts. All of which helps to explain why Tottenham had the highest challenge intensity in the league after a dozen games.
The wider challenge for Postecoglou and his team will be to keep up that intensity, and their form, on a consistent basis.
To learn more about football tactics and gain insights from top class professional coaches, visit CV Academy
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